
Make Your Pricing More Effective ...
Here’s are two simplified (fictional)Â deals:
DEAL 1 | Region 1 | Region 2 | Region 3 | Region 4 |
Product 1 | 15% | 10% | 20% | 15% |
Product 2 | 25% | 35% | 35% | 25% |
Product 3 | 40% | 35% | 40% | 40% |
and
DEAL 2 | Region A | Region B | Region C | Region D |
Product A | 40% | 40% | 40% | 35% |
Product B | 35% | 25% | 25% | 35% |
Product C | 20% | 15% | 15% | 10% |
Which is the better deal for the customer? Deal 1 or Deal 2?
Scroll down for the answer …..
They are the same deal.
Deal 2 looks better because it has been presented with the larger discounts in the top-left hand corner of the matrix. Using this approach certainly placated one customer who it turned out was becoming unhinged by the first discount which met their eye as it was presented in Deal 1: 15%. And then by time they got to the second number  – 10% – they were no longer rational. Conversely when Deal 2 was presented they immediately thought that 40% was a huge improvement over the 15% – even though they knew they were for different products. In their mind they had characterized Deal 1 as 15%, and Deal 2 as 40%. And they thought, in the same way that probably everyone does, that they were a sophisticated, rational and objective purchaser.
Maybe it has something to do with some other aspect of the business …….. Just to re-cap, 7 out of the last 8 quarters have shown positive year-over-year growth. Last quarter was a record quarter for 3Q:
So what’s the problem? Let’s look at market-share:
A decline of 860 bps in global revenue market-share from 38.5% to 29.9% from 4Q10 to 2Q15 (according to IDC) might be the reason. Which is really brought into sharp focus when you look at market-share gap:
Although the gap to Dell has now widened to 800 bps from a low of 560bps (D), this is less than half what it was in 4Q10 (A) – 1,740 bps. And there are no signs of recovery in market-share either: it has been pretty flat since 1Q14.
And to simplify the visual, selecting specific quarters:
That’s a lot of market-share to lose. And there are no indications that ISS is making any traction in re-gaining any of that lost market-share opportunity. So maybe this is why ISS’s progress in its revenue growth is being over-looked.
Let’s see what Tuesday’s results from HP and next week’s market-share update from IDC brings.
Well looking at HP ISS …. and this format might be strangely familiar to some of you: dark green highlighting indicates +ve Y-o-Y growth; red, negative.
Green good, red bad. Still with me? Yes?
Green with yellow bolded font shows record quarters; light green indicates weak +ve growth between 0-2% … the reason for this will be clear when we look at HP Storage.
So in the past 8 quarters there has been quite a lot of dark green: 7 of the past 8 quarters have shown growth which came after 8 consecutive quarters of red. So ISS clearly is showing signs of a turnaround, whereas looking at HP Storage:
So that’s pretty clear. No turnaround there. But what about Technology Services, HP Enterprises’s “crown jewel” according to Meg Whitman:
Just lots of red. Well, that seems pretty straightforward. It’s just not a “great business”. And since we have mentioned them, just to complete the picture, let’s add HP Networking:
**I’ve excluded 3Q 2105 because of (a) non-organic growth was only cited with currency impact excluded (and so isn’t consistent with everything else above) (b)Â the impact of acquisitions – and not just because there is non-organic growth that has been rather expensively paid for, but think about it: also the core business is now highly incented to perform, particularly if “adopt -and-go” is the integration approach for overlapping product segments, i.e. they had better grow or they are out ….
So why was HP Storage and HP Enterprise Services’s non-existent turnaround highlighted so much in the quarterly call?
Presented at a Professional Pricing Society webinar on 14th September, 2015 by Philip Daus of Simon-Kucher Partners.
Which category do you fall into?
1. Is your pricing effective?
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3. The Impact of Effective Pricing: A Case Study
4. How do we achieve that "magical" pricing effect?
5. How do we create that pricing "magic"?
6. What is the deliverable?
7. What do you gain with effective pricing?
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