So at least the X86 server group is growing again which good for HP since it has the potential to become a growth engine for HP Enterprises ….
More in the next blog. Why even positive Y-o-Y growth sometimes isn’t all that it seems ….
Make Your Pricing More Effective ...
So at least the X86 server group is growing again which good for HP since it has the potential to become a growth engine for HP Enterprises ….
More in the next blog. Why even positive Y-o-Y growth sometimes isn’t all that it seems ….
Cathie Lesjak: “Technology Services declined 9% year-over-year, or 3% in constant currency, although support orders were up year-over-year in constant currency again this quarter and profitability remained good. We are seeing continued adoption of our new portfolio, including Datacenter Care and Proactive Care, and expect TS to continue to stabilize with improving hardware sales.â€
The Pricing Factory®: Technology Services Y-o-Y revenue growth doesn’t show any evidence of stabilization. It continues to be not only negative in real currency but negative at an increasing rate (blue in chart to the left). 11 successive quarters of negative growth in real currency is starting to add up to multiple years of negative growth. In fact HP Technology Service hasn’t yet posted a single quarter of positive year-over year $ growth in its existence as a reporting entity in the Enterprise Group which is pretty remarkable. Not even the odd potentially redeeming 1% Y-o-Y growth that HP Storage manages to throw in periodically. So TS isn’t showing any tangible sign of “stabilizing”.
Nor does the $ dollar attach rate to either HP ESSN (Servers + Storage + Networking) (red line in chart to the left)) or more crudely to just ISS/X86 Servers show any “stabilization”. It just continues to decline.
So given the available data, here’s a couple of very worthy and justifiable questions from an analyst during the call:
Aaron Rakers: Just curious as we think about the separate entities how the company thinks about the Technology Services piece, particularly as it relates to the fact that you’ve talked about positive growth on the order side. We’ve seen some positive trends on the hardware side. However, the reported growth on a year-over-year basis continues to decelerate. So when do you expect that actually to start to turn positive, and how are we thinking about the margin profile of that piece of the portfolio?
Meg Whitman: “So let me tell you, so Technology Services is the crown jewel of Enterprise Group. This is one great business,
– There is a lag  in “as sold” and “as reported” only if hardware is growing. And as you contradict yourself later, hardware hasn’t always been growing.
 - It’s not a currency issue, or at least you can’t use currency as an excuse. This problem has occurred for the past 11 quarters. Currency has not been an issue for each of the past 11 quarters. And even if it had, some action should have been taken by now to mitigate that by now.
– But Technology Services has declined by a greater % than the Enterprise Group as can be seen from the declining % attach rate. As $ hardware sales go down the reported $ attach rate % should in fact increase due high levels of revenue deferred from earlier years, not decrease.
– The real decline in TS $ attach in the BCS isn’t due to the decline in BCS/Itanium. The attach rate on Itanium isn’t that dissimilar to X86 because a low volume Intel-built chip has a much lower failure rate than a low volume chip from a low volume manufacturer. And real decline occurred during the the PA-RISC to Itanium transition that more than a decade ago so HP has had plenty of time to mitigate this one.
– Well, year-over-year negative $ growth over multiple quarters and multiple years suggest that  the vacuum has only been partially filled which is hardly remarkable.
– Well as we’ve seen in the previous blog, hopefully not like Storage which isn’t growing at all. BTW, the attach rate is at it’s worst level which hardly qualifies as “very good”.
– Not true. Every customer may need technology services but that doesn’t mean that they need to buy them from HP’s Technology Services. In fact with HP’s use of the channel (unlike Dell) it leaves them very exposed to the channel substituting their own services and also end-users “rolling their own” (self-maintainers).
So either way, the facts are that the $ attach rate to both HP ISS and HP ESSN (Servers + Storage + Networking) continues to decline and is now at the lowest point ever.
So here’s an example of a couple of great questions by an analyst – Aaron Rakers – the first of which on decelerating growth wasn’t answered correctly on the basis of HP’s own data, and the second on margin profile, wasn’t addressed at all. So his questions remain unanswered. Can someone point out why anyone should be feeling “pretty good†about Technology Services the way Meg is? Or even that the business has stabilized the way Cathie thinks it has?
And ask yourself this: what exactly is it that HP Storage will be able to do after the split that it couldn’t do today?
[Pause}p.s. I really wasn’t going to post this until a friend asked at lunch how HP Storage was doing because she’d heard that they were doing rather well, at which point ….
Put out feelers to find out the extent of their communications to customers and channel partners; check out their website, industry press, and social media. Monitor the situation. Be extra vigilant. Increase the frequency of your competitive monitoring.
In the first case that I mentioned in my previous blog, following the competitor’s downward price move would have more likely make it difficult for them to see that they had made a mistake in the first place. Competitor premiums would have returned to their “normal” level. Monitoring competitor premiums would have been the one, and perhaps the only analysis that they were performing. You’re starting to get more insight into what metrics they do and do not monitor. Useful. Following them down and normalizing the premiums would reduce the probability of them noticing and correcting their error. And this is what you want them to do, notice that they made an error and correct it.
In the second, it was in a way gratifying to note that all our competitors had ignored our super low pricing. Remember, our list prices were lower than everyone else’s street prices (list minus average discount). All our competitors had ignored our pricing. Not some of our competitors, all of them. Not some of pricing, all of our pricing. There was no mention of our super low pricing anywhere in the press or online. It was as if our prices hadn’t existed. This was good news. They – we – somehow hadn’t trashed the margins in the industry. It left the door open for us to raise prices and remove a potentially destabilizing threat to the profitability of the market.
In the third, not raising prices in the face of a weakening local currency would have made us miss our US$ financial targets and also – because the competitor premiums would have been “normal” – there would have nothing to indicate to our competitor that might want to consider raising prices too. We had to raise prices, and keep on raising them, even if they didn’t.
So how did these situations resolve themselves?
In a second case, I started working with a small division in a company and I realized that its products were massively under-priced compared to the competition. It’s list prices were lower than the competitors’ average discounted prices (street price). Not just one competitor, all of them. Think about that: list prices lower than competitors’ street. That effectively it had created the potential for a price war without even realizing. And because it didn’t realize this – it was still growing more quickly than all the other divisions in the company which had helped it evade internal scrutiny – it hadn’t fully taken advantage of its aggressive price position.
In a third case, one of our major competitors didn’t raise prices as that country’s currency declined in value rapidly against the US$ during the 2008 financial crisis. As we – and our other competitors in this US$ denominated industry – raised our prices across the board three times, this one competitor did nothing. We observed this for about nine months and they still didn’t move. Nor did they try to take advantage of their aggressive price position; there were no communications to customers or the channel. They didn’t have an uptick in sales or market-share. They were asleep at the wheel.
So how do you try to stop a competitor’s inadvertent move from turning into a fully-fledged price war? More to follow.
1. Is your pricing effective?
2. Do you get actionable insights?
3. The Impact of Effective Pricing: A Case Study
4. How do we achieve that "magical" pricing effect?
5. How do we create that pricing "magic"?
6. What is the deliverable?
7. What do you gain with effective pricing?
8. How can we do business together?
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Price Floor, n. technical. 1) The deal price at which you no longer need a Sales Rep; 2) The deal price which, if you did all deals at, you would no longer need a Sales Department. … [Read More...]
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